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THE  PARENTAL  CHOICE  FALLACY  IN  EDUCATION
REFORM  DEBATES
James G. Dwyer*
INTRODUCTION
Some tout parental school choice as a strategy for promoting,
among other school-related goods, educational innovation.1  This
Article offers clarifying and skeptical thoughts about that position.  It
first explains what “educational innovation” and “parental choice”
mean.  It then considers what limitations on this strategy might arise
from existing legal regulations, from market forces, or from ethical
obligations to children.  Finally, the Article explains why parental
choice is also unlikely to improve education for the children most in
need of a better academic environment and suggests an alternative
approach to student reassignment that is much more likely to do so.
I focus on educational innovation because this Article appears in
a symposium entitled “Educational Innovation and the Law.”  I sus-
pect the organizers of the symposium did not really have educational
innovation in mind, but rather one of the other concepts discussed
below—in particular, improvement of educational quality.  Neverthe-
less, it is interesting to talk about educational innovation and its con-
nection or lack thereof with parental choice.  I do not have a position
on whether innovation is needed.  Presumably one would take the
 2012 James G. Dwyer.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Arthur B. Hansen Professor of Law, William & Mary School of Law
1 See Richard W. Garnett, The Right Questions About School Choice: Education, Relig-
ious Freedom, and the Common Good, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1281, 1283 (2002) (“Many
have urged that we respond to this failure [of public schools] by introducing competi-
tion, empowering parents to choose from among a diverse array of schools, . . .
encouraging experimentation rather than standardization . . . .”); Chia-Lin Hsieh &
Jianping Shen, Is School Choice a Mechanism for Sustaining Change?  Implications from a
National Survey, 75 THE CLEARING HOUSE 88, 88 (2001) (“[P]roponents [of school
choice] argue that charter schools make it possible for parents to join with teachers
and administrators in creating and managing innovative schools . . . .”).
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position that it is needed after concluding that existing pedagogies
are inadequate.  Like most other participants in the school reform
debate, I know very little about primary or secondary school curricu-
lum and instructional techniques, so I would not presume to make
such a judgment.  My own ignorance is part of the reason I am skepti-
cal about relying on parental choice to promote educational innova-
tion, or even to improve schools’ delivery of existing curricula and
pedagogies.  Being a parent has not transformed me into the omnis-
cient being that defenders of parental entitlement sometimes seem to
suppose all parents are.  Rather than argue that innovation is needed,
then, I simply accept that some people think it is and address what
obstacles might exist to using expanded parental choice as a means to
achieving this aim.
Part I clarifies what I understand educational innovation to be
and distinguishes that from other concepts at play in the school
choice debate.  Part II considers various limitations on innovation in
curriculum and instruction and gives reasons for skepticism about
reliance on parental choice as a means to any aim other than gratify-
ing parents.  Part III offers an alternative, more child-centered
approach to student reassignment.
I. WHAT IT MEANS TO PROMOTE EDUCATIONAL INNOVATION
THROUGH PARENTAL CHOICE
“Educational” means relating to instruction of students, provid-
ing knowledge and information, and fostering skills through a learn-
ing process.2  “Innovation” is the act or process of inventing or
introducing some new thing or way of performing a task.3  Thus, “edu-
cational innovation” means creating a new pedagogy, a new way of
instructing and training students.  This is distinct from several similar
concepts.
First, educational innovation is distinct from educational quality,
which means success at achieving educational aims, aims that could be
as old as the hills and that might be achieved by long-established peda-
gogical methods.  Presumably those who advocate parental choice as a
strategy for promoting educational innovation hope that this will
improve educational quality, but the two things are distinct.  Innova-
tion can actually lower quality, as arguably occurred when schools
switched to factory-prepared meals for school cafeterias.4  Conversely,
2 See I THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 785 (1993).
3 See id. at 1373–74.
4 See Kirk Johnson, School Districts Rediscover Value of Fresh Cooking, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 17, 2011, at A16 (describing emerging phenomenon of schools returning to pre-
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one might improve educational quality without innovating, simply by
making teachers work harder at applying their current approach.
One might also improve quality by having teachers switch to a differ-
ent, but already established, approach.  Thus, innovation is also differ-
ent from change; innovation is a change to something new.
Because “educational” refers to what teachers do in the class-
room, “educational innovation” is also not equivalent to innovation in
school financing or administration.  Parental choice has become
almost synonymous with directing taxpayer money in different direc-
tions, rather than only to neighborhood-based public schools, but
such funding decisions are far different from decisions about how best
to teach children math, science, reading, etc.  What success some
charter schools appear to have had seems to be the result mostly of
administering schools in a different way—for example, by firing bad
teachers more readily, being more active in recruiting and more selec-
tive in hiring new teachers, and making everyone work longer hours
(all of which, incidentally, are traditional rather than novel adminis-
trative practices).5  One could do all these things while expecting
teachers to apply only traditional pedagogies.
“Parental choice” in the school reform discourse typically means
empowering parents to choose, from at least two options, which
school their children attend.  The school options can range over a
tremendous variety of public, private, and quasi-public offerings.  The
state and the private market together can make available: neighbor-
hood-based public schools, attendance at any public school in the
family’s school district, choice among a subset of all public schools in
a district, magnet schools, schools in a different school district, quasi-
public charter schools, secular private schools, religious private
schools, and home instruction.
We can distinguish parental choice so understood from at least
two other ways by which a child’s academic course might be deter-
mined.  First, there can be choice within a given school.  Most public
middle and high schools offer parents and students a variety of
options internally for specific courses.  There are typically core sub-
jects that all must take, but parents and students might be able to
choose from among different sections of those courses taught at dif-
ferent levels or with different approaches.  And there are elective
courses from which parents and students choose a subset.  Some
1980s practice of making meals from scratch, because the innovation of purchasing
and reheating factory-made meals has contributed to the obesity epidemic).
5 See Sam Dillon, Troubled Schools Mimicking Charters, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2011, at
A16.
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schools boast special programs that comprise a cluster of elective
courses in a particular field, such as the fine arts or the physical sci-
ences.  Such intra-school freedom in course of study is not usually
included within the meaning of “parental choice” in school reform
debates, even though it too might generate the competitive dynamic
that advocates for parental choice think will promote innovation and
better quality education.
A second alternative to parental choice from among private and
public options is to have someone other than parents choose from
among different schools or programs.  For example, state legislatures
could codify a rule that students in the bottom five percent of any
public school must enter into a special program within that school or
must move to another school that will better serve them.  Another pos-
sibility is that state or local officials could delegate to a multi-discipli-
nary team—including, perhaps, teachers, guidance counselors, and
social workers—the task of identifying the students in each public
school who are most in need of a different educational program or
school.  There is curiously little attention given in education reform
debates to the question of who is really in the best position to make
school assignment decisions in such a way that maximizes overall stu-
dent well-being.  Correspondingly, advocates for parental choice have
much to say about how choice spurs competition, but little to say
about why it is best to make parents the choosers, given that choices
by other decision makers might also spur competition, perhaps even
better competition.
II. WHAT LIMITATIONS EXIST ON PARENTAL CHOICE AS A STRATEGY
FOR EDUCATIONAL INNOVATION
Most of what has been written about limitations on parental
choice programs addresses potential constitutional obstacles.  There is
a large literature, in particular, debating whether the Establishment
Clause precludes states from channeling funds to religious schools,
along with other private schools.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision
in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris6 largely answered that question, in the
negative.7  I have taken the position that voucher programs that
include religious and other private schools are not merely permissible
constitutionally, but in fact mandatory—as a right not of parents but
of the children in those schools—so long as the state attaches sufficient
regulation and oversight to ensure that the money is used to provide
6 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
7 See id. at 662-63.
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secular education.8  In this Article, I consider what obstacles to educa-
tional innovation might arise from other sources—namely, existing
school regulations, market forces, and ethical obligations to children.
I conclude that the first of these makes a private school choice policy
more likely to produce educational innovation, but that the other two
counsel in favor of public or quasi-public school choice as a means to
innovative programming.  In any event, I find much reason to doubt
that parental choice promotes educational innovation or educational
improvement.
A. Regulatory Limitations
States heavily regulate public schools, dictating in substantial
detail both the education provided, including curriculum and assess-
ment, and administrative policies such as hiring standards, discipli-
nary measures, and safety practices.9  As critics of the No Child Left
Behind Act10 have complained, there is little freedom in public
schools today for teachers to experiment with new approaches or even
to use well-established teaching techniques that would require deviat-
ing from the prescribed curriculum or foregoing time for standard-
ized test preparation.11
In sharp contrast, states leave private schools virtually unregu-
lated, giving them complete freedom as to what and how they teach.12
States typically require only that private schools report their enroll-
ment numbers, profess to teach certain core subjects, and comply with
8 See JAMES G. DWYER, VOUCHERS WITHIN REASON 198 (2002).
9 For examples of some states’ public school regulations, see MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 37 (2011); OR. ADMIN. R. 581 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59 (2011).
10 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006).
11 See, e.g., B.A. Birch, Reading and Math Is Stifling Curriculum, Say Teachers, EDUC.
NEWS (Dec. 10, 2011), http://www.educationnews.org/education-policy-and-politics/
reading-and-math-is-stifling-curriculum-say-teachers/ (discussing how “two-thirds of
public school teachers believe that a concentration on English and mathematics . . .
has forced focus away from other core academic subjects”); Daniel Denvir, School: It’s
Way More Boring Than When You Were There, SALON (Sept. 14, 2011, 4:18 PM), http://
www.salon.com/2011/09/14/denvir_school/ (“Preparation for increasingly high-
stakes tests has reduced time for social studies and science.”); Oliver Ortega, ETHS
Teacher, NU Alum Meets With Obama to Discuss Education Reform, THE DAILY NORTHWEST-
ERN, (Sept. 28, 2011, 2:09 PM), http://www.dailynorthwestern.com/city/eths-teacher-
nu-alum-meets-with-obama-to-discuss-education-reform-1.2639891#.TIT_OmOyBg
(“No Child Left Behind has created an academic culture fixated on standardized test-
ing . . . .”).
12 See James G. Dwyer, The Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child Wel-
fare and Education Laws as Denials of Equal Protection to Children of Religious Objectors, 74
N.C. L. REV. 1321, 1329–53 (1996).
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health and safety codes.13  How they teach any subject is entirely up to
them.14  In fact, if a private school did not do any teaching of core
subjects, state and local education officials likely would not discover it
and, even if they did, might have no power to do anything about it.15
So there is no real regulatory limitation on innovation in the private
school sector.  Does this change when the state subsidizes private
schooling?  Existing private school choice programs for the most part
add no meaningful instructional requirements or oversight.16  Thus,
in practice, vouchers can be spent at fundamentalist indoctrination
camps that provide little or no secular education.17
13 See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 51202, 51220 (West 2011) (requiring health edu-
cation and core subjects including English, mathematics, science, and social science);
IND. CODE ANN. § 20-30-5 (2011) (requiring classes in government, health, drug edu-
cation, career development, and core subjects).  Iowa requires that teachers in private
schools be “certified,” but certification requirements are quite limited and this
requirement does not in any way limit what teachers do in their classrooms. Cf. Fel-
lowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 815 F.2d 485, 492 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that for
certification Iowa requires only a bachelor’s degree and having taken a “human rela-
tions course”); id. at 493 (“Iowa’s certification process does not prevent teachers in
plaintiff schools from teaching from a Biblical perspective . . . .”).  Nebraska requires
that private school teachers meet the same certification requirements as public school
teachers, but this again does not limit what happens once teachers are in the class-
room.  See NEB. REV. ST. § 79-1601 (2011).
14 Cf. Johnson v. Charles City Cmty. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 368 N.W.2d 74, 83 (Iowa
1985) (rejecting fundamentalist Christians’ objection to a requirement that their
schools teach particular subjects, noting that this requirement left the schools free to
teach those subjects in any way they wished).
15 See generally James Forman, Jr., The Rise and Fall of School Vouchers: A Story of
Religion, Race, and Politics, 54 UCLA L. REV. 547 (2007) (arguing for greater state
oversight of private, particularly religious, schools).
16 See DWYER, supra note 8, at 175–82.  For specific examples, see IND. CODE § 20- R
51-4-1(a)(1) (2011) (“[T]he department or any other state agency may not in any way
regulate the educational program of a nonpublic eligible school that accepts a choice
scholarship under this chapter, including the regulation of curriculum content, relig-
ious instruction or activities, classroom teaching, teacher and staff hiring require-
ments, and other activities carried out by the eligible school.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 17:43 (2011) (outlining Louisiana’s Student Scholarships for Educational Excel-
lence Program); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3310.02 (West 2011) (outlining Ohio’s edu-
cational choice scholarship pilot program).
17 Even those religious schools that ostensibly teach secular subjects might teach
those subjects in a politically and socially skewed manner. See, e.g., JAMES G. DWYER,
RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 7-44 (2001); Frances Patterson, With God
On Their Side . . ., RETHINKING SCHOOLS (2002), available at http://www.rethinking
schools.org/special_reports/voucher_report/v_god162.shtml (describing extreme
bias found in religious school social studies text books).  For the view that “faith
schools” are inherently indoctrinatory, see Michael Hand, A Philosophical Objection to
Faith Schools, 1 THEORY & RES. EDUC. 89–99 (2003).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\87-5\NDL502.txt unknown Seq: 7 16-AUG-12 9:49
2012] the  parental  choice  fallacy 1843
In between the heavily regulated public schools and the unregu-
lated private schools are the quasi-public charter schools, schools
administrated by private companies but within the public school sys-
tem.  They are subject to close state oversight and to some of the sub-
stantive regulations that govern traditional public schools, but they
are given greater freedom than public school administrators with
respect to some practices, especially hiring, firing, and length of
school day and school year.18  To what extent charter schools are
legally free to engage in “educational innovation” varies from state to
state.  In practice, their freedom must be quite limited because they
must, like public schools, subject their students to the all-consuming,
state-prescribed standardized tests and stake their reputation mostly
on the basis of the results.19
In sum, the current regulatory environment makes the private
school sector much more conducive to educational innovation than
the public and quasi-public sectors, simply because there are great
regulatory constraints on the public side and generally none on the
private side.
B. Market Limitations
The real, practical obstacle to innovation in the private school sec-
tor is that private schools in America today must appeal to parents, the
vast majority of whom feel completely free (in a way many did not a
half century ago, because of greater pressure then from religious insti-
tutions) to choose a public school, any other nearby private schools,
or homeschooling for their children.  This is an obstacle to innovation
because parents generally do not want educational innovation, at least
not for their own children.  Why anyone would think parental choice
would promote educational innovation is therefore quite mysterious.
In my fifty years of life and twenty plus years of scholarly interest in
education policy, I have never seen any evidence of any parents think-
ing, “I just want something new for my kids, some way of educating
that has not been done before.”  There are at least three reasons why
parents do not value educational innovation per se.
First, parents usually actually want the opposite of innovation
when it comes to raising their children; they want child-rearing meth-
ods that are tried and true, that have been used on other people’s
18 See Jamie Gottlieb, Harmonizing No Child Left Behind’s Restructuring Provision and
State Charter School Laws: The Need for Autonomy, Flexibility, and Adequate Resources, 39
SETON HALL L. REV. 191, 192 (2008) (describing the flexibility and oversight of char-
ter schools).
19 See id. at 192.
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children long and successfully enough to be a safe bet.20  Parents are
highly risk averse when it comes to education, medical care, and other
important aspects of their children’s wellbeing.21  As evidenced by the
difficulty in getting parental consent to medical experiments on chil-
dren, parents typically do not want their children used as guinea pigs,
do not want people with new ideas experimenting with their children.
Often parents want their children’s schools to do something different
from what they have been doing, because they disapprove of the out-
comes they are seeing or hearing about with existing practices.  But
the alternative they would prefer is typically either some other proven
practices or simply executing the same practices in a better way.  Par-
ents are concerned with educational quality, not with educational
innovation, and they would prefer access to well-established educa-
tional methods that have been proven to be of high quality.  Probably
most would like other people’s children to be subjected to educational,
medical, etc., experimentation, in the hope this might yield some new
and improved methods, but not their own.
People are typically willing to experiment with important aspects
of their own or their children’s wellbeing only when existing options
are very poor.  People agree to experimental surgeries, for example,
when there are no existing methods with a decent rate of success, but
not when there are long-used methods with a high rate of success.  If
your child has appendicitis and one surgeon says he would like to try a
new technique that no one has tried before, you are likely to look for
a different surgeon who will use a well-established technique.  In con-
trast, with advanced cancer, one might grasp at straws because existing
procedures offer little hope of survival.  Education, at least for chil-
dren within the normal range of abilities, is more like an appendec-
tomy than like surgery for Stage 4 brain cancer.  There are already
many very successful schools using well-established pedagogical meth-
ods, so a rational and risk-averse parent will prefer a school using such
methods to one offering a brand new approach.
20 See Margaret F. Brinig & Nicole Stelle Garnett, Catholic Schools, Urban Neighbor-
hoods, and Education Reform, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 887, 901 (2010) (“Parents (includ-
ing non-Catholic parents) cite a number of reasons for choosing these [Catholic]
schools for their children, including a desire for systematic religious instruction, for
the inculcation of ‘values,’ for a ‘traditional’ curriculum, and for a more structured,
disciplined learning environment.”).
21 See generally Richard P. Eibach & Steven E. Mock, The Vigilant Parent: Parental
Role Salience Affects Parents’ Risk Perceptions, Risk-Aversion, and Trust in Strangers, 47 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 694 (2011) (demonstrating that adults take fewer risks
when making decisions in the role of parent).
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There is, of course, a variety of educational approaches in the
private school sector today, and at some point a significant number of
parents would have had to choose a school with a particular approach
in order for the school to survive.  Whether any of the approaches was
truly “new” at the time any school in America adopted it is debatable,
however.  For example, what many people think of as innovative is the
student-directed approach of Montessori-type schools, but this
approach did not originate in America and was not the result of
parental choice.  Montessori schooling originated in Italy around
1900, an experiment Maria Montessori tried on poor children whose
parents had no other choice or whose parents were indifferent or
absent.22  Montessori schooling became an American phenomenon
only in the 1960s, after six decades of experience elsewhere, and at a
time when generalized suspicion of tradition and “the establishment”
motivated many young adults to experiment with new things in many
areas of life.23  What we have seen in more recent decades in the U.S.
are new schools adopting pre-modern approaches, many having the
word “Classical” in their names or touting a “back to basics” philoso-
phy,24 and we see a private school sector dominated by religious
schools whose methods are for the most part those that prevailed in
public schools twenty to a hundred-and-twenty years ago.25
In short, what parents really want is not innovation but better
quality.  Probably this is also true of advocates for parental choice;
they do not simply have a taste for newness, enjoying the thrill of mix-
ing things up.  Rather, they mostly want better education for children,
and they believe parental choice will produce that.  Probably most
have in mind that empowering parents to choose something other
22 See Valeria Babini, Science, Feminism and Education: The Early Work of Maria
Montessori, 49 HIST. WORKSHOP J. 44, 53 (Sarah Morgan & Daniel Pick trans., 2000).
23 See Paul Willcott, The Initial American Reception of the Montessori Method, 76 SCH.
REV. 147, 161 (1968) (explaining that after initial curiosity, American interest in
Montessori pretty much vanished by 1920); see also Patricia McBroom, Montessori
Expands, 88 SCI. NEWSL. 375, 375 (1965), (chronicling the Montessori boom in the
1960s).
24 See, Andrew Lee Havis & Thomas Daniels Yawkey, “Back-to-Basics” in Early Child-
hood Education: A Re-Examination of “Good Old ‘Rithmetic,” 98 EDUC. 135, 135-36 (1977)
(discussing an approach of “retaining and using contemporary principles of mathe-
matics education in conjunction with the ‘back-to-basics’ philosophy”); Mitchell
Landsberg, Back to Basics: Why Does High School Fail So Many?, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 29,
2006), http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jan/29/local/me-dropout29.
25 See Samuel G. Freedman, Lessons From Catholic Schools for Public Educators, N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 2010, at A17 (explaining that Catholic schools have kept to their tried-
and-true teaching methods, and for instance “never conceded their curriculum to
progressive trends like whole language, constructivist math and relativistic history”).
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than the neighborhood public school will improve education quality
by creating pressure for schools to apply established methods better.26
What I am suggesting here is that if they instead think parental choice
will improve education by causing more pedagogical experimenta-
tion, they face the obstacle that parents do not want anyone experi-
menting with their children.  Surely there are better ways of teaching
children yet to be discovered.  However, they are more likely to
emerge, if at all (the intensified regulatory environment for public
schools discussed above makes it less likely), in the public school sec-
tor, where (a) there is less need for parental approval, (b) the vast
majority of new graduates of education schools go to work, and (c)
there is an established practice of funding research and accommodat-
ing pilot projects.  The most likely site of innovation in the private
realm is in university laboratory schools, which are few in number and
typically already receiving government financial support in the form
of grants.27
A second reason why parents do not express a desire for educa-
tional innovation is that a substantial percentage of them place
greater importance on ideological conformity than on intellectual
development.  The vast majority of private schools are religious, and
some parents who send their children to religious schools—namely,
those patronizing certain fundamentalist schools—reject educational
attainment in the mainstream sense for their children, especially for
their daughters.28  This fact considerably weakens all the common
arguments for parental choice.  In particular, it makes no sense to
speak of parental choice generating competitive pressure that will
improve public schools insofar as the alternative schools parents
choose have entirely different aims than public schools do.  Public
school administrators and teachers will not react to the movement of
children to fundamentalist religious schools by working harder to lure
the children back.  Instead they are likely to believe that no amount of
effort on their part could change the parents’ decision.
26 See Clive R. Belfield & Henry M. Levin, The Effects of Competition Between Schools
on Educational Outcomes: A Review for the United States, 72 REV. EDUC. RES. 279 (2002)
(summarizing dozens of studies finding modest academic gains from school
competition).
27 University laboratory schools are founded in a spirit of innovation and educa-
tional experimentation. See Anne Durst, ‘Venturing in Education’: Teaching at the Uni-
versity of Chicago’s Laboratory School, 1896–1904, 39 HIST. EDUC. 55, 62 (2010).
28 See DWYER, supra note 8, 7-44.  The same is true of homeschooling. See J.C. R
Blokhuis, Review of Robert Kunzman, Write These Laws on Your Children: Inside the
World of Conservative Christian Homeschooling, 8 THEORY & RES. EDUC. 322, 322–26
(2010).
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Even among parents who would choose a private school affiliated
with a more moderate faith institution, a school that does emphasize
secular education and intellectual development as well as religious
instruction, there is not likely to be much taste for educational nov-
elty.  As a general matter, religious schools are the least likely site of
educational innovation, even though most of them are academically
solid.29  Most religious institutions in western, liberal society view
themselves as bulwarks of tradition.30  They resist change and modern-
ization, or at least evolve very cautiously, and they worry especially
about new developments in society undermining their efforts to per-
petuate their faith through schooling of children.31  Moreover, they
do not conduct research on pedagogical methods in secular subjects.
There can be exceptions, of course, but it would be startling to hear of
a Catholic parish school, for example, being the first in the nation to
offer a new pedagogy in a secular subject.  As noted above, parents
who patronize Catholic schools express a desire for a traditional
curriculum.
A third reason why parents do not desire brand new methods of
teaching is that most do not feel capable of evaluating whether new
methods are good methods.32  Advocacy of parental choice as a means
to innovation and therefore to better quality education must presuppose
not only that parents are willing to experiment but also that parents
are able to identify new ideas for teaching that are good ones.  But
there is little reason to suppose that parents are any better at evaluat-
ing competing approaches to pedagogy than they are at evaluating
competing approaches to appendix surgery for their children.  And I
have never heard of anyone advocating parental choice as a strategy
29 See, e.g., Brinig & Garnett, supra note 20, at 901; Freedman, supra note 25 (dis- R
cussing religiously affiliated schools and their reluctance to change).
30 See, e.g., Johnson v. Charles City Cmty. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 368 N.W.2d 74,
76–77 (Iowa 1985) (“[B]eginning in the 19th century, there has been growing con-
cern among Christian ‘fundamentalist’ churches with what they consider to be the
calamitous threat of secular humanism. . . . It was to answer this perceived threat that
the plaintiffs felt impelled to establish their own school.”).
31 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that Amish parents
have a constitutional right to deprive their children of an education after eighth
grade, in order to avoid attrition from the Amish faith).
32 There are many guides that have been developed in order to help parents to
select a school. See, e.g., Jamie Gumbrecht, How to Choose a School for Your Child, CNN
(Jan. 25, 2011, 10:32 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/LIVING/01/24/parents.
school.choice/index.html; How to Evaluate and Choose a School, PROJECT APPLESEED,
http://www.projectappleseed.org/choose.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2012); Kayla
Webley, 7 Things You Need to Know About a School (Before You Enroll Your Kid), TIME
(Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2089618,00.html.
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for promoting surgical innovation and thereby improving surgical
techniques.  There is an implicit denigration of education experts in
much of the advocacy for parental choice in education, a supposition
that the average person on the street is as capable of assessing educa-
tional quality as anyone with a Ph.D. in education.  I do not think that
of myself, even though I think I am above average in my powers of
discernment.
Now, one might say that with schools as with medicine, anyone is
capable of judging by the results.  If a surgeon’s new technique saves
lives, anyone can judge the value of that, without needing to go to
medical school.  So, too, anyone can judge an innovative school by the
outcomes for its students.  One problem with this reasoning is that,
again, no one wants to go first; parents want proven methods, pre-
cisely because they feel incapable of judging new pedagogies in
advance of seeing outcomes.  A second problem with this reasoning is
that what most parents, like most participants in the school choice
debate, rely on to judge outcomes for different schools are standard-
ized test scores.33  This is a problem for those who would use parental
choice to promote educational innovation that leads to better quality
education because (1) those scores for the most part reflect success at
quite old-fashioned pedagogical methods (i.e., rote learning, “drill
and kill”),34 (2) many education experts believe those tests bear little
relationship to good education,35 and (3) private schools do not have
to administer standardized tests, so parents might not have this infor-
mation available to assess private schools.36  (This last fact is often
ignored by those who maintain on the basis of test scores that private
schools in general, Catholic schools in particular, or homeschools are
as good as or better than public schools; the self-selection seriously
skews the averages.  In any event, average performance for a large cat-
33 See Mark Schneider & Jack Buckley, What Do Parents Want from Schools?  Evidence
from the Internet, 24 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 133, 136 (2002) (finding that
a primary decision factor for parents in school choice is standardized test scores).
34 See Jonathan Kozol, Confections of Apartheid Continue in Our Schools, 71 EDUC.
DIG. 6, 17-18 (2006).
35 See Harvey Siegel, High Stakes Testing, Educational Aims and Ideals, and Responsi-
ble Assessment, 3 THEORY AND RES. EDUC. 219 (2004); Michael Winerip, Teaching Beyond
the Test, to Make Room Again for Current Events, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2011, at A21; How-
ard Blume, Focus on Standardized Tests May Be Pushing Some Teachers to Cheat, L.A. TIMES
(Nov. 11, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/07/local/la-me-teacher-
cheating-20111107; How Standardized Testing Damages Education, FAIRTEST, (Aug. 20,
2007, 1:00 PM), http://fairtest.org/facts/howharm.htm.
36 See DWYER, supra note 8, at 170 (explaining that “[m]any schools . . . simply R
refuse to comply, and state education officials do nothing about it”).
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egory of schools is useless information in policy making and in paren-
tal decision making.)
In sum, then, parental choice is quite unlikely to produce educa-
tional innovation and even less likely to produce innovative programs
that better educate students.
C. Ethical Limitations
Educational innovation entails experimentation—that is, trying
something new and not knowing in advance whether it will succeed.
Similarly, medical innovation entails experimentation.  Unlike medi-
cal experimentation, though, educational experimentation cannot
start with other species; it has to start with human children.  And
unlike medical experimentation, with educational experimentation in
the private sector there is no state-imposed regulatory, supervisory, or
compensatory system to guard against bad choices.  With new private
school programs, there is not the sort of pre-experiment review of a
proposal, oversight during the experiment, and rigorous post-inter-
vention assessment that usually characterizes medical trials.37  Medical
experiments are carefully controlled, and parents simply may not con-
sent to experiments known to pose a significant risk of substantial
harm to their children.38  With private school education, as explained
above, there are no boundaries within which experimentation must
take place, and no precautions that must be taken.  Parents are
empowered to consent to any sort of schooling for their children.
And with educational blunders, there is no legal recourse for those
harmed.  Yet educational innovation can go very badly and can have
life-altering bad consequences.39
Therefore, one ethical limitation on advocacy for parental choice
as a strategy for educational innovation is the duty everyone involved
in education policy arguably has to “first, do no harm.”  All should
take seriously the reality that our legal system tolerates every imagina-
ble sort of private alternative to public schools and the possibility that
by advocating for vouchers or tax credits or some form of subsidy for
private choice, you will cause some children developmental harm.  A
37 See 21 C.F.R. § 50.54–.56 (2011) (stating the rules for clinical trials concerning
or involving children).
38 See id.
39 In Florida, for example, the system of charter schools has been accused of
lacking oversight and of “cherry-picking” students to avoid those with severe disabili-
ties, nearly creating a segregated system. See, e.g., John O’Connor & Sarah Gonzalez,
Florida Charter Schools Failing Disabled Students, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 14, 2011),
http://www.npr.org/2011/12/14/143659449/florida-charter-schools-failing-disabled-
students.
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voucher program on a large scale will undoubtedly result, for exam-
ple, in some girls transferring from a gender-egalitarian public school
environment to a religious school in which they are taught that their
role in life is to serve men and that they should not plan to go to
college.40  It will result in some children watching fundamentalist
religious videos all day instead of receiving an education.41  No advo-
cate of state funding for private schooling should be taken seriously
until they take seriously the lack of regulation and oversight in the
private school sector.  Yet one would be hard pressed to find a school
voucher proponent who does so.
Most private schools, let us assume, are schools that provide a
good education.  They might provide religious instruction, but they
also teach secular subjects and they do so well.42  Many parents send
their children to such schools even in the absence of state financial
assistance.  I have argued in the past that the state should give those
families financial assistance, if that assistance would result in improve-
ment to the secular education those schools provide.43  Again, this is
not something parents are entitled to; they have chosen not to accept
the public schooling offered, and they have no more right to state
funding of a private alternative than does someone who prefers a
religious library to the public library or a religiously orthodox history
museum to the Smithsonian.  Rather, it is the children whose parents
place them in private schools, and whose secular education suffers
from want of funding, who have this right.44  In fact, it should not be
problematic for the state to give money directly to religious and other
private schools, so long as the amount (a) is based on the number of
children who attend and (b) on a per-pupil basis does not exceed the
40 See DWYER, supra note 8, at 7-44; see also Barbara Miner, School Vouchers: A Threat R
to the Rights of Women and Gays, 6 RETHINKING SCHOOLS, (2002), available at http://
www.rethinkingschools.org/special_reports/voucher_report/v_gay.shtml; Patterson,
supra note 17. R
41 See, e.g., Scott Stephens & Mark Vosburgh, Voucher School Relies on Videos as
Teachers, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, July 7, 1999 (describing a fundamentalist Christian
school in Cleveland that had no teachers and instead used state money received
through Cleveland’s school choice program to purchase religious videos that the chil-
dren spent most of the school day watching).
42 For instance, Catholic schools have been regularly praised for closing educa-
tional gaps between different ethnic groups in urban areas. See Freedman, supra note
25.  For a discussion on producing students more likely to graduate from college and
earn higher wages, see Derek Neal, The Effects of Catholic Secondary Schooling on Educa-
tional Achievement, 15 J. LAB. ECON. 98, 98 (1997).
43 See DWYER, supra note 8, at 148-68. R
44 See id. at 99-114, 148-68.
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school’s cost of providing secular instruction.45  Under the Cleveland
voucher program approved in Zelman, the state did send checks
directly to religious schools, rather than to parents.46  Vouchers issued
to parents were simply a means of counting the number of eligible
children at a particular school, so that requirement (a) was satisfied.
However, the state did nothing to ensure requirement (b) was met, or
even that religious schools receiving state money were providing any
secular education.47  The state and the Court therefore failed with
respect to this first ethical obligation to children.
There is, additionally, a second relevant ethical obligation that
conflicts with reliance on parental choice to produce innovation or
educational improvement.  Advocates of private school choice would
like for the state to offer vouchers to parents whose children now
attend public school, or at least to poor parents whose children attend
failing public schools, so that they too can send their children instead
to private schools.  That is commendable.  But even if we focus nar-
rowly on the idea of using parental choice to enable poor parents to
move their children from the worst public schools to decent private
schools, there is a fairness problem.  Now the problem is not (just)
that reliance on parental choice makes some children vulnerable to
bad parental choices—that is, to being moved to a bad private school,
but rather that it leaves unaided the children who need it the most—
namely, those whose parents are too disengaged or incapable to par-
ticipate in the program.  Existing parental choice programs help the
children, within whatever the target population is, who need help the
least, and leave behind in the worst schools the children who are in
most desperate need.48  That is so because the most important factor
in the wellbeing and educational success of children in poor commu-
nities is competent parental involvement.49  Taking advantage of a
45 For a fuller presentation of this argument, see id. at 115-47.
46 Id. at 148-68.
47 See id. at 178-80; James G. Dwyer, Funding Religion in a Post-Zelman World, 5
GOV’T, L. & POL’Y J. 11 (2003).
48 See, EDWARD B. FISKE & HELEN F. LADD, WHEN SCHOOLS COMPETE 8-9 (2000);
Bruce Fuller et al., Policy-Making in the Dark: Illuminating the School Choice Debate, in
WHO CHOOSES?  WHO LOSES?  CULTURE, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE UNEQUAL EFFECTS OF
SCHOOL CHOICE 8-11 (Bruce Fuller & Richard F. Elmore eds., 1996).  For a similar
criticism of merit-based selection for magnet school programs, see Mark C. Vopat,
Magnet Schools, Innate Talent and Social Justice, 9 THEORY & RES. EDUC. 59 (2011).
49 See generally ANNETTE LAREAU, UNEQUAL CHILDHOODS (2003) (discussing the
adverse impacts of absent parents on their children’s education); Nancy E. Hill &
Lorraine C. Taylor, Parental School Involvement and Children’s Academic Achievement:
Pragmatics and Issues, 13 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 4, 161 (2004) (describing
the ways in which parental involvement concretely promotes academic success).
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voucher program requires some effort and competence, so those who
do it are likely also to be regularly helping their children with school
work and making sure their children are safe, well-fed, well-clothed,
well-rested, and disciplined.50  In contrast, the many parents in
blighted urban neighborhoods who are too busy, too indifferent, or
too incapacitated to ensure that their children do their homework
and have a good breakfast before school are also least likely to apply
for a voucher or otherwise advocate for a better school assignment for
their child.  This concern, too, makes it difficult to understand the
enormous emphasis placed on parental choice as a means of moving
children from a bad school environment to a better one.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO SCHOOL CHOICE
As Part I hinted, there are conceivable ways other than parental
choice by which students might transfer from one school to another
in order to improve their education.  I suggest the following alterna-
tive approach to addressing the serious problem of bad urban schools:
State or local government could establish a practice of having a multi-
disciplinary team in each school or in each school district decide
which pupils are most in need of moving to a different educational
setting and/or most likely to benefit from such a move.  Most likely
this would be the students whose academic performance is farthest
below their potential (and, correspondingly, whose parents are least
involved in their children’s lives).  School officials would then send
notice to the parents of those pupils that those children will transfer
to another school, public or private, at public expense.  Crucially, any
alternative school will have been qualified by state education officials,
based on its having demonstrated proficiency in secular education,
and will be subject to ongoing oversight and accountability.  To satisfy
parental rights or Establishment Clause concerns, parents could be
empowered to opt out of this reassignment program, but it is unlikely
that many would do so.  Parents might also be given a choice among a
few alternative schools, but only among schools which state education
officials have approved.
This is a general proposal, not worked out in detail, intended to
provoke discussion.  On the surface, at least, it seems that a parent
opt-out approach of this sort, with careful selection and monitoring of
the alternative schools, would do much more good for children and
constitute a more effective use of state resources than are the “parent
50 Cf. JOSEPH P. VITERRITI, CHOOSING EQUALITY 9 (1999) (stating that “parents
who take advantage of school choice tend to be better educated and more astute than
those who do not”).
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opt-in with no oversight of private alternatives” approaches that cur-
rently exist and that most advocates of school choice have favored.  If
that is true, then anyone genuinely concerned about improving the
life prospects of children born into poverty should give this proposal
serious consideration and try to figure out whether and how it could
work in practice.
The following objections might be expected: As to restricting
state-funded pupil transfers to state-approved schools, some might
object that this improperly interferes with religious freedom, insofar
as it requires religious institutions to conform to state standards in
order to receive a large financial benefit.51  The state would skew the
market for private schooling by creating a financial incentive for par-
ents to choose some schools rather than others.  However, the state
routinely purchases goods and services from private suppliers and
properly requires that the suppliers meet quality standards, even
though some might be unable to satisfy those standards because their
religious faith commands them to offer goods or services in a particu-
lar, different way.  For example, a police department does no wrong
by refusing to purchase Amish buggies for their cruisers, even though
this discrimination might make it more difficult for Amish communi-
ties to survive.  Similarly, state programs providing reimbursement for
medical care of children are certainly not constitutionally required to
pay also for Christian Scientist “spiritual treatment” of sick or injured
children, even though refusing to do so creates an incentive for par-
ents to choose a doctor instead of a spiritual treatment practitioner.
A related objection might be that the discrimination among
schools that state approval of voucher schools entails infringes paren-
tal rights, because it imposes a cost on parents who choose a nonap-
proved school.  However, although the U.S. Supreme Court has
required that states empower parents to choose a private school for
their children,52 it has never required that states fund private schools
nor that the state avoid discriminating among schools on legitimate
secular grounds in providing assistance.  Moreover, the Court has
repeatedly stated that states are free to impose regulations on private
schools, even in the absence of state assistance, to ensure that they
provide an adequate secular education.53  Thus, states are constitu-
tionally free not only to refuse funding for private schools that do not
51 See Paul Finkelman, School Vouchers, Thomas Jefferson, Roger Williams, and Protect-
ing the Faithful: Warnings from the Eighteenth Century and the Seventeenth Century on the
Danger of Establishments to Religious Communities, 2008 BYU L. Rev. 525, 542 (2008).
52 See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
53 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 510.
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meet state educational standards but in fact to shut down such
schools.  In its 2002 decision approving a voucher program that
included religious schools, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Court cru-
cially assumed (albeit without basis in the record) that all receiving
schools were providing an adequate secular education.54  It was
implicit that the state may not, consistent with the Establishment
Clause, direct state money to private schools that provide only relig-
ious instruction.  By extension, the state could not pay for ninety per-
cent of a school’s budget if only five percent of instruction were
secular, or only twenty-five percent; there must be a rough match
between the funding the state supplies and the secular component of
the school’s operations.55  But the state cannot ensure this except by a
close examination of the school’s operations prior to inclusion in the
program and regular review of student progress thereafter.
With respect to the parental opt-out aspect, insofar as it departs
from the prevailing approach of responding only to parent requests
for a transfer rather than to student need per se, some might object
that this unwisely transplants the decision as to where children go to
school from the best judge of children’s welfare (parents) to a worse
decision maker (the state).  There are numerous problems with this
objection.  One is that my proposal does retain an element of parental
choice; it allows parents to decline an offer of transfer.  Arguably the
state should require any parents who assert a desire to opt out to pro-
vide a good reason for doing so, a reason tied to the developmental
needs of their child.  This would be consistent with the Supreme
Court’s statements about parental decision making power.56
54 The Court’s only mention of what voucher schools are like was a statement that
a school could be accepted into the voucher program if it “meets statewide educa-
tional standards.” See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 645 (2002).  The
Court appeared oblivious to the fact that that Ohio’s “statewide standards” for private
schools, like those of other states, were quite superficial and did nothing to ensure
private schools were providing a sound secular education. See DWYER, supra note 8, at R
178–80.
55 See DWYER, supra note 8, at 198-210. R
56 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 57 (2000) (plurality decision) (hold-
ing that state adjudicating a nonparent visitation petition must simply apply a pre-
sumption that a parent’s refusal or restriction of visitation is in the child’s best
interests, subject to rebuttal by the nonparent); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 229–30 (concluding
that Amish parents had a right to withdraw their adolescent children from schooling,
based in part on an assumption that this would have no adverse impact on the chil-
dren); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“Acting to guard the gen-
eral interest in youth’s well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s
control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor,
and in many other ways.  Its authority is not nullified merely because the parent
grounds his claim to control the child’s course of conduct on religion or conscience.”
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An additional problem with this objection is that it rests on the
“omniscient parent fallacy.”  Even the most well educated people are
unlikely to be capable of assessing the relative quality of instruction in
different schools unless they have received training specifically in the
education of children.  And the parents whose children attend the
worst schools are among the least-educated, lowest-functioning adults
in American society.57  Other articles in this symposium discuss the
great problems of teen dropouts, juvenile delinquents, and non-
English-speaking immigrants.58  Those very teens about whose capac-
ity even to survive the authors are worried will soon make up a large
percentage of parents in the worst urban areas.59  Those who insist
that parents are the best decision makers need to confront the fact
that most of the parents in the context under discussion—that is,
state-funded pupil transfers out of the worst schools—themselves
dropped out of high school, spent time in jail, suffer from substance
abuse problems, and/or speak little English.  Those people do not
suddenly become omniscient as a consequence of procreating.  Even
the most capable parents in such communities must feel themselves
largely dependent on school officials to tell them whether and how
the neighborhood school is failing and which other schools do better;
they do not themselves sit in classrooms and compare what they see
against prevailing learning theories.  Of course, part of what is wrong
with some urban public schools and better about urban private
schools has to do not with the curriculum or pedagogical approach
but rather with such noninstructional phenomena as violence and
teachers’ sleeping at their desks.  But discriminating among schools
(footnotes omitted)); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534 (acknowledging “the power of the State
reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their
teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend some school,
that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain
studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be
taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare”); see also Fellowship Baptist
Church v. Benton, 815 F.2d 485, 489 (8th Cir. 1987) (upholding a teacher certifica-
tion requirement for private schools against a parental free exercise challenge).
57 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. R
58 See ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, TRUE AMERICAN (2010); Peter H. Schuck et al.,
What Happens to the ‘Bad Apples’: An Empirical Study of Suspensions in New York City
Schools, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2063 (2012).
59 Consistently, youth from lower-income families and urban areas are less likely
to graduate from high school. See, e.g., Sam Dillon, Large Urban-Suburban Gap Seen in
Graduation Rates, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2009, at A14 (reporting graduation rates for
different socioeconomic classes); Event Dropout Rates by Family Income, 1971–2001,
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS (2004), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indica
tor_evl.asp (finding that lower-income youth are more likely to drop out of school).
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based on those things does not require the expertise assumed by those
who adhere to the omniscient parent hypothesis.
Further, as noted above, the children likely to be in greatest need
of transfer to a different school are precisely those whose parents are
least involved, those who do not receive help with school work at
home and who do not have a parent advocating for them in the
school.  Teachers and guidance counselors know who these children
are, and there might be no one else who does.  The state will serve the
greatest need and get the most for its limited funds if it targets those
children for transfer.  The prevailing approach of offering choices to
parents and making any transfer depend on parental efforts does the
opposite; it directs state funds to the pupils in bad schools who are
least in need of transfer precisely because their parents are the most
capable and involved in their children’s lives in that community.  That
is not to say that those children would not be better off if transferred,
but rather that other children are in greater need yet left behind.
And there does not seem any reason for this regressive approach
other than to gratify parents and those bewitched by the slogan of
parental choice.
Finally, some might worry that state-initiated transfers from pub-
lic to religious schools conflict with the Establishment Clause.  The
Supreme Court has placed great emphasis on parental choice of
schools in its decisions on state funding of religious schools, sug-
gesting that this avoids the problem of state favoritism for religion.60
My proposal retains an element of parental choice, and it is unknown
whether the Court would find that the opt-out approach involves
parental choice sufficiently to make any choice of a religious school
for a child attributable to parents rather than the state.  In a subset of
cases in which students might transfer to an approved religious school
under the approach I recommend—namely, those in which parents
are simply absent from their children’s lives—the transfer will be the
result of a state decision rather than parental choice.  Those cases will
not be readily identifiable, because from the state’s perspective they
will look no different from cases in which parents are involved but
concur in the decision.  That might worry or satisfy the Court; it is
impossible to predict.  The situation might appear more constitution-
ally legitimate if one views cases in which parents are absent or indif-
ferent as ones in which the state is serving as a quasi custodian.  It
would then resemble the situation of children who are in foster care
because of parental absence or indifference, as to whom the state
must choose a school.  The Court has not addressed Establishment
60 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 645 (2002).
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Clause constraints on state decision making in the foster care context,
but it might well conclude that when the state has custody of a child
and so stands in loco parentis, it is free to choose a religious school for
the child if that is the best available option for secular education.  By
extension, the Court might deem it permissible for education officials
to designate some pupils for transfer to a religious school even when
there is no real parental choice involved.
I would go further and maintain that the Court’s emphasis on
parental choice in Establishment Clause doctrine is a mistake.  What is
crucial for purposes of state nonestablishment is that the state choose
and pay for secular education based on the secular concern that cer-
tain children need to be in a better school.  As with medical care,
parental choice is neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure this.  My
proposal requires that the state direct money only to schools it has
approved on the secular ground that they primarily provide an ade-
quate secular education, and that choice among schools rest solely on
the secular concern with the academic needs of the students.
Whether chosen schools are operated by religious institutions should
be irrelevant.  Whether children would incidentally receive religious
instruction as a result of the state’s choice is not, in my view, a suffi-
cient concern to preclude the choice; the educational needs of the
children override that concern.  I would also require that the amount
of state money directed to any private school be on a per-pupil basis
and limited roughly to the percentage of a school’s per-pupil costs
that reflect provision of secular instruction, based on some reasonable
cost-allocation method.61  As noted above, this limitation should be
required even for parent opt-in programs; the concern that the state
might end up paying for catechism class is not limited to a voucher
program of the sort I recommend.
There is a legitimate concern that a multi-disciplinary team could
systematically favor religious schools over secular ones for religious
reasons, if all or most team members belong to the same faith as a
local religious school.  But that seems unlikely to occur in any urban
American school district, where there is typically great cultural diver-
sity.  It is surely less likely than parents in an opt-in program choosing
to transfer their children primarily or even solely for religious reasons.
As noted in Part II, in existing parent-choice programs, parents can
use state subsidies to transfer their children to a worse academic envi-
ronment, and some do so because they place greater importance on a
religious immersion experience for their children.  Even if all schools
receiving state subsidies had to receive state approval, it is theoreti-
61 See DWYER supra note 8, at 199–204. R
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cally possible in a parent opt-in approach that some parents could
make their children worse off academically by transferring them to a
religious school, which they might do for religious reasons, and it is
constitutionally problematic for the state to subsidize that parental
decision.  The best check against the state’s financing a religiously
based pupil-transfer decision might be the system I suggest, whereby a
group of public employees who have devoted their careers to secular
education (as evidenced by their employment in a public school) col-
lectively decide the best placement for the neediest children.
Lastly, I note the limited nature of the proposal offered here; it is
not a comprehensive plan for state funding of private schooling.  It
suggests a way for deciding which children currently in the worst pub-
lic schools should transfer to some other school.  A comprehensive
plan would also encompass children just entering school at the earli-
est ages and communities other than poor urban areas.  Some differ-
ent considerations come into play in those other contexts, but my
reasons for skepticism regarding parental choice would apply in them
as well.62
CONCLUSION
I am a highly educated and politically progressive person, and I
am a parent.  Yet I have no desire for educational innovation per se,
and if my daughters’ schools did inform me that they planned to
launch an experimental curriculum, I would not feel qualified to
assess whether the curriculum is likely to be a good one.  If giving me a
choice as to which school my daughters attend and which program
they pursue within the school is not likely to induce educational inno-
vation that in turn improves the quality of education, then I cannot
imagine how giving such choices to the average parent or to parents
in impoverished  neighborhoods is going to do so.
As I suggested at the outset, I suspect that those who advocate for
parental choice are not really much interested in educational innova-
tion.  But even putting aside innovation as a mediating phenomenon,
I fail to perceive a clear connection between parental choice and
higher quality service in the realm of education (or medicine, nutri-
tion, entertainment, etc.).  In thinking about who should make deci-
sions about important aspects of children’s lives, it is important to be
aware of what sort of expertise is required for each type of decision
and who has what sort of expertise.  As a general matter, we parents
are experts in our children’s personalities and histories, but not much
62 For a more comprehensive theory of child-centered school choice, see DWYER,
supra note 8. R
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else.  Parents per se are not experts in cognitive development, curricu-
lar design, learning strategies, or medicine.  Advocates for parental
choice in education need to address squarely this expertise deficit in
parents.  And they must also confront the reality that (a) some parents
simply are not driven in their schooling choices for their children by a
desire to secure for them the best possible education, and so would
use the state subsidies offered in a private school choice program to
finance oppressive fundamentalist religious indoctrination for their
children, and (b) the law currently does little to limit the schooling
options that such parents can choose.  Unless and until this concern is
obviated, public school student reassignment plans must be the pre-
ferred way of using competitive pressure and administrative experi-
mentation to improve educational quality.  There is also the
undeniable fact that a significant percentage of parents are simply
indifferent or incapable of advocating for their children, and it does
not help those children to make better schooling available on a paren-
tal opt-in basis.  To address all these reasons for skepticism about
parental choice, I suggest as an alternative that choice programs be
limited to schools that the state has approved for their demonstrated
proficiency in secular education and that school personnel select chil-
dren for reassignment based on need.
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